

# Revised SoS Regulation: ReCo System For Gas and Simulation of Disruption Scenarios

**EnC Security of Supply Coordination Group** 

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### **Revised SoS Regulation and RCSG**

### Article 3 Responsibility for security of gas supply

5a. In the event of a regional or Union emergency crisis, the transmission system operators shall cooperate and exchange information using the Regional Coordination System for Gas (ReCo System for Gas) where already established by ENTSOG. ENTSOG will inform the Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States concerned.



## Regional Coordination (ReCo) System for Gas – Main objectives





- A broader vision of all gas flows entering the EU MS
- > European TSOs and EU aim to
  - enhance the level of Security of Supply in crisis situations
  - provide an overview of the main gas supply flows

Bridging the gap of non-existing international cooperation in a crisis situation

> Install Regional Coordination Teams


> Provide toolboxes





## **Regional Coordination Teams**











### Aim

- avoid, prevent or mitigate negative impact of gas disruption in appropriate region in case of any technical or whatever reason
- to be well prepared to any possible crisis or negative situation

# ReCo teams are the Tool

- Fast and reliable informing TSOs which could be impacted about possible negative event
- Joint cooparation between TSOs, listening each other and looking for the mutual and regionnal solutions

### Result

Wide view and detail information about possible negative situation

Final mutual and regional decision which takes into acount arguments and positions of all participating TSOs

### **Reginal Coordination Teams**



### Members

 Free for all TSOs which are a part of the chain of the appropriate gas flow route

### **Facilitator**

- To establish the meeting in case of need
- Annual rolling basis
- Communication exercise

### Coordinator

- •The coordinator is chairing the ReCo Team whenever it comes together.
- •Acts as the spokesman of the ReCo Team in order to provide first-hand information.
- •By default this role will be allocated to the TSO initially calling the facilitator.

### **ENTSOG**

- Organizes meeting explanations, presentations, ToRs, change of facilitator
- Provides WebEx tool for communication

### Responsibility

 All TSOs taking part in the ReCo teams are acting in their own responsibility. They can't be forced to carry out any specific action. All agreed upon solutions and actions are executed on a voluntary basis only.



### **ReCo System for Gas. Functioning**



- Guidance
- Email pre-print
- Facilitator for each ReCo Team
  - Fixed telephone number
  - 24/7 reachability
  - Getting the ReCo teams members together in short notice
    - Virtual room via webex
    - Discussing possible short term solutions

#### Toolbox

- Swaps
- Re-directing of gas
- Extra capacity
- Operational Map
- Etc.


#### Coordinator for each ReCo Team

- Coordinating the Team
- Spokesman of the Team





## ReCo System for Gas – Communication Flowchart







## **Revised SoS Regulation – Simulations**

## ENTSOG's role in Revised SoS Regulation




Extract of Article 6 (revision from 5 May 2017)

By 1 November 2017 ENTSOG shall carry out a Union wide simulation of supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios including the identification and assessment of Emergency Supply Corridors. The simulation shall also identify which Member States can provide a solution to address identified risks, including in relation to LNG. The scenarios and the methodology shall be defined by ENTSOG in cooperation with the GCG. ENTSOG shall ensure an appropriate level of transparency and access to its modelling assumptions used in its scenarios. The Union-wide simulation of supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios shall be updated every four years unless circumstances warrant intermediary updates.

## Disruption scenarios



>Supply and infrastructure disruptions scenarios



## **General Assumptions**



- 1. Disruption duration
  - 2 months for offshore infrastructures
  - 2 weeks for onshore infrastructures
  - 2 months for other disruptions
- 2. Gas demand assumptions
  - Highest winter demand since 2009/2010
  - Highest winter demand + 2-week cold spell in 20 years
  - Highest winter demand + Peak-Day in 20 years
- 3. Infrastructure assumptions
  - Existing infrastructure with capacities as of today (1 Oct. 2017)

## Simulation methodology



#### Assumptions Scenario Reference case definition definition simulation • Define the Demand no disruption disruption to Capacities • 3 demand simulate situations (high Supply Define the demand, 2duration to week, Peakconsider day) See slide 9 See slides 6 and 14 Comparison disruption / Disruption simulations Results analysis reference case • 16 scenarios Assess the impact of Identify the disruption infrastructure • 3 demand situations limitations (high demand, 2-• Demand curtailment week, Peak-day) at EU level / risk group level Curtailment allocation

See slide 14

See slides 6 and 14

See slide 16

## Modelling principles



### ENTSOG simulate a whole winter from 1 October to 31 March

### Disruptions scenarios Supply and **Simulations** infrastructure Modelling tool disruption Supply levels Curtailed demand Infrastructure topology – capacities **Analysis** Infrastructure limitations Curtailment allocation **Assumptions** Demand Supply (including storage)

### **High demand events**



### For all scenarios, 3 different assessments proposed by ENTSOG

- > Impact of a high demand winter (whole winter simulation)
- Impact of a 2-week in 20 years high demand situation during a disruption (2-week cold spell simulation)
- > Impact of a Peak-day in 20 years during a disruption (Peak-day simulation)




## High demand events proposal



#### 1. Whole winter

- > Reference case: no disruption
- > Onshore technical disruption: 2 weeks from 15 February to 28 February
- > Offshore and non-technical disruption: 2 months in January and February



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### **High demand events proposal**



#### 2. 2-week cold spell in 20 years

- > For the reference case and all 16 scenarios
- > From 15 February to 28 February\*
- > Simulated simultaneously with the disruptions

### 3. Peak-day in 20 years

- > For the reference case and all 16 scenarios
- > On 15 February\*
- > Simulated simultaneously with the disruptions








Limitation	Pipeline imports	LNG imports	Indigenous production
Seasonal	highest winter average supply in 5 years		Based on data collection for winter 2017-18
Monthly	highest monthly supply in 5 years		
Weekly	No additional limitation	Week 1: imports similar to normal conditions + flexibility ensured by LNG tanks Week 2: imports can increase up to the maximum potential + use of remaining LNG tanks capacities	Except for Danish production (complete shut down)
Daily	highest daily supply in 5 years	maximum send-out capacity	

# Supply assumptions proposal – storage levels



- > Working Gas Volume: from GIE/AGSI transparency platform in 2017
- > Initial levels to start the simulation:
  - historical low for the last 5 years on 1 October.
- The modelling considers possible injection during early winter if demand and supply configuration allows for it




Historical stock level during winter for all EU Source: ENTSOG Winter Review 2015-2016





### Storage withdrawal capacities

- > The influence of UGS inventory level on the withdrawal capacity is modelled with deliverability curves provided by GSE.
- > These curves represent a weighted average of the facilities (salt caverns, aquifers or depleted fields) of each country.



Evolution of withdrawal capacities with storage levels

### **Exports assumptions proposal**



- > Exports to Ukraine, Kaliningrad and Turkey based on 5 years history
- > Exports to Turkey set at 0 in case of Ukraine route disruption
- > Exports to Kaliningrad set at 0 in case of Belarus and Baltic states route disruption




## Imports specificities



### Algerian supply disruption proposal

- > Pipeline and LNG routes disrupted
- > Divided in 2 periods based on feedback from France and Spain after GCG meeting of 22 March
  - 1<sup>st</sup> period (0 to 3 weeks): send-out capacity of terminals receiving Algerian LNG are reduced by the share of Algerian LNG in their mix (based on public information)
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> period (3 weeks to 2 months): Algerian LNG imports are assumed replaced by other LNG supplies and no extra limitation is considered



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hare of Algerian LNG in the NG mix per country in 2016 Source: GIIGNL

Belgium

Finland

France Greece

Lithuania Netherlands

Poland

Spain Sweden

UK

Portugal

Italy

First period (3 weeks)

Second period (after 3 weeks) >

0%

0% 67%

100% 3%

0%

0%

0%

12% 21%

0%

2%

## **Proposed methodology**



### Reference case definition (no disruption)

Reference scenario

Demand assumptions

Supply assumptions



Reference case (no disruption)

### Reference case

- > 3 simulations (whole winter + 2-week during high demand winter + Peak-day during high demand winter)
- > No disruption
- > Existing infrastructure
- > Demand assumptions: in accordance with GCG outcomes
- > Supply assumptions: in accordance with GCG outcomes

This case is a reference when assessing the resilience of the infrastructure against the different disruption scenarios.


## Proposed methodology



2. Scenarios simulations (#1 to #16)



- > All parameters similar to the reference case except for the disrupted supply / infrastructure
  - 3. Comparison of the outcomes of each scenario to the reference case







### **Thank You for Your Attention**

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