




# **System Operation Guideline**

# Marco Pasquadibisceglie SO GC TF Co-chair


#### **Frequency and balancing**







#### More generation – >50 Hz




More load – <50 Hz



# **Frequency and perturbation**

Each product has a specific scope All together aim to keep the system in balance





### **Frequency ancillary services**

Service	Activation time	Control
Frequency containment reserve (FCR)	Some seconds	Automatic – local control
Automatic frequency restoration reserve (aFRR)	Some minutes	Automatic – central control
Manual frequency restoration reserve (mFRR)	Up to 15 minutes	Manual – disposed by TSO control room
Replacement reserve (RR)	More than 15 minutes	Manual – disposed by TSO control room



### **System operation in Europe**





Star of Laufenburg – first reliable interconnection between Switzerland, France and Germany (1958)

UCPTE (then UCTE) – first TSO association on voluntary basis

Good level of cooperation under voluntary basis



ENTSO-E: replacing UCTE as TSO association under third package umbrella



# 28/09/2003


- Night between Saturday and Sunday
- 3 am in the morning
- Lowest load on a weekly basis
- Lavorgo Mettlen (Lukmanier pass line) tripped – N-1 security triggered
- Not properly coordinated remedial actions between Italy and Switzerland
- Cascading event





# 04/11/2006

- Conneford Diele double circuits was opened to allow a ship to pass through the Ems river to the North Sea
- Usual request, but improperly managed
  - Disconnection originally planned at 1 am 05/11 was anticipated at 10 pm 04/11
  - Real exchanges between North and South Germany were underestimated
- Subsequent overloads cascading event



Situation aggravated by loss of DSO connected plants in the red area




#### **Lessons learnt**

- Voluntary coordination may fail
- Harmonization of rules for DSO connected plants is of utmost importance
- Each TSO shall have visibility also of the networks of the adjacent TSOs
- Training staff with the same competences across Europe may help the daily operation



# Third package





# SO GL

- Operational security
  - Stability, voltage, power flows, remedial actions
  - Data exchange
  - SGU compliance and training
- Operational planning
  - Scenarios and common grid models
  - Operational security analysis in planning phase (RSC role)
  - Outage coordination and short term adequacy assessment




# SO GL


- Load frequency control
  - Operational agreements and frequency quality
  - Load frequency control structure and operation
  - FCR, FRR and RR requirements
  - Sharing and exchanging of reserves
- Entry into force
  - 14/09/2017
  - Data exchange from 14/03/2019
  - Applicable also to third countries (Balcans, Switzerland)




#### **Frequency and balancing**




Balanced system – 50 Hz





#### More generation – >50 Hz




More load – <50 Hz



# **Frequency and perturbation**

Each product has a specific scope All together aim to keep the system in balance






### **Frequency ancillary services**

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# Load frequency regulation hierarchy





#### **System states**

Normal state	<ul> <li>All conditions fullfilled</li> <li>Voltage and power flows within operational security limits</li> <li>Frequency within the standard range (50 mHz steady state deviation) or steady state deviation&lt;200 mHz and alert state not triggered</li> <li>Active and reactive power reserves sufficient to withstand contingencies</li> <li>Operation will remain within operational security limits after the activation of remedial actions to cope with contingencies</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Voltage and power flows within operational security limits</li> <li>TSOs reserve consists reduced by more than 20% for longer than 20 minutes without</li> </ul>

- TSOs reserve capacity reduced by more than 20% for longer than 30 minutes without any compensation
- Steady state deviation<200 mHz exceeding 100 mHz for longer than 5 minutes or 50 mHz for longer than 15 minutes
- At least one contingency leads to violation of operational security limits



Alert state

#### **System states**


Emergency state	<ul> <li>At least a violation of operational security limits</li> <li>Frequency outside normal and alert state range (e.g. steady state deviation &gt; 200 mHz)</li> <li>At least one measure of the TSO's defence plan is activated</li> <li>Failures in tools and facilities for more than 30 minutes</li> </ul>
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- Loss of more than 50% of demand
- Total absence of voltage for at least three minutes leading to triggering of restoration plans




Blackout state

#### **System states**







# **Operational security in planning phase**



#### **Regulation 2019/943 – RCC concept**



#### **New Acer Decision – April 2022**





5 SORs

- Central (Coreso and TSCnet)
- SWE (Coreso)
- SEE (SEleNe CC)
- Baltic (Baltic RCC)
- Nordic (Nordic RCC)


Agreement with 3rd countries neighbouring TSOs

# ER NC

- Defense plans with some harmonized features (e.g. low frequency demand disconnection)
- Restoration plans with some harmonized features (e.g. backup control room, 24 hours emergency power supply)
- 12 months for plants involved in the plans to comply with the technical requirements



#### **ER NC**





# 08/01/2021

- Busbar coupler in Ernestinovo tripped
  - It wasn't monitored in N-1 situation
  - Unusual power station operation
- High flows
  - The flows between East West were underestimated
- Subsequent overloads cascading event





## **Further lessons learnt**

- High flows may turn to be close to angle stability
- Modelling bus coupler cannot be left aside
- Coordination with 3rd countries TSOs is fundamental
- New role for interruptible load as defense/emergency measures
- SO GL and ER NC need to be amended

