ANNEX 1

Energy Community cybersecurity and critical infrastructure cooperation group
(CyberCG)

Terms of References

This document describes the organizational structure, activities and the responsibilities of all parties concerned within the coordination group for cyber-security and critical infrastructure ("CyberCG").

1. General
The CyberCG aims to support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information within the Energy Community and to develop trust and confidence, and with a view to achieving a high common level of security of network and information systems and of critical infrastructures in the Energy Community.

2. Definition of Terms
For the purposes of Article 4 of Procedural Act 2008/02/MC-EnC and the present Annex, the following definitions apply:

a) ‘network and information system’ means: (a) an electronic communications network within the meaning of point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC; (b) any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data; or (c) digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by elements covered under points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance;

b) ‘security of network and information systems’ means the ability of network and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems;

c) ‘national strategy on the security of network and information systems’ means a framework providing strategic objectives and priorities on the security of network and information systems at national level in accordance with requirements of Article 7 of Directive 2016/1148/EU;

d) ‘operator of essential services’ means a public or private entity which provides an energy service that (i) is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities, (ii) the provision of that service depends on network and information systems, (iii) and an incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of that service, in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 5(2) and Article 6 of Directive 2016/1148/EU;

e) ‘energy services’ comprise (i) electricity generation, supply, market operation, distribution, transmission, and storage, (ii) natural gas production, supply, market operation, transmission, distribution, storage and LNG, (iii) oil production, refining and treatment facilities, market operation, storage and transmission, (iv) monitoring and control of pollution and emissions from energy combustion and (v) digital services and electronic communication services, in case and to the extent that the latter provide services to operators of essential services of the energy sectors, and/or that provide services that are essential to the functioning of the energy sector;

f) ‘critical infrastructure’ means an asset, system or network or part thereof within or interdependent with the energy sector or services referred to in point e), located in Contracting Parties which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety,
security, economic or social well-being of people, the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Contracting Party as a result of the failure to maintain those functions;

g) ‘Energy Community critical infrastructure’ means critical infrastructure located in Contracting Parties the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact on at least two Contracting Parties and/or Member States;

h) ‘owners/operators of critical infrastructures’ means those entities responsible for investments in, and/or day-to-day operation of, a particular asset, system or part thereof designated as a critical infrastructure in the relevant Contracting Parties. For the avoidance of doubt, the definition of an operator of critical infrastructure encompasses and is broader than that of an operator of essential services, as it covers also critical infrastructures that do not depend on information network and systems;

i) ‘incident’ means any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information systems or on critical infrastructures within the meaning of Article 6 of Directive 2016/1148/EU, or any event causing a disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure installations within the meaning of cross-cutting criteria in Article 3(2) of Directive 2008/114/EC;

j) ‘incident handling’ means all procedures supporting the detection, analysis and containment of an incident and the response thereto, as provided under Directive 2016/1148/EU and related implementing acts or under Directive 2008/114/EC and related implementing acts;

k) ‘risk’ means any reasonably identifiable circumstance or event having a potential adverse effect on the security of network and information systems or on critical infrastructures within the meaning of Article of Directive 2016/1148/EU and related implementing acts, or having the potential of causing a disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure installations within the meaning of cross-cutting criteria in Article 3(2) of Directive 2008/114/EC, including cyber-attacks or threats, natural disasters, terrorist threats of attacks or any other sources of threat or attack;

l) ‘risk analysis’ means consideration of relevant threat scenarios, in order to assess the vulnerability and the potential impact of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure or network and information systems;

m) ‘protection’ means all activities aimed at ensuring the functionality, continuity and integrity of critical infrastructures in order to deter, mitigate and neutralize a threat, risk or vulnerability;

n) ‘standard’ means a standard within the meaning of point (1) of Article 2 of Regulation 1025/2012/EU;

o) ‘specification’ means a technical specification within the meaning of point (4) of Article 2 of Regulation 1025/2012/EU.

3. Composition

3.1. The CyberCG consists of representatives of the Parties (competent authorities and single point of contacts), the CSIRTs network, security liaison officers, the Secretariat, the European Commission, and the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (“ENISA”).

3.2. Representatives of Observer and Participant countries may participate in the CyberCG.

3.3. Where appropriate, the CyberCG may invite representatives of the relevant stakeholders to participate in its work.
3.4. The Secretariat shall provide assistance and logistical support to the CyberCG.

4. Single points of contact

4.1. The single points of contact exercises a liaison function to ensure cross-border cooperation of Parties’ authorities and with the relevant authorities in other Parties, with the CyberCG and the CSIRTs network. Tasks of the single point of contact may be assigned to the competent authority.

4.2. Single points of contact notify and report to the CyberCG, the CSIRTs network and the Secretariat, by 15 January 2019, and every year thereafter, on provisions of national law and measures in the fields covered by point 2. e) of this Annex, including but not limited to:

   a) adoption of a national strategy on the security of network and information systems covering at least the sectors and services referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex, in compliance with requirements laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2016/1148/EU, and adoption of security strategies or equivalent instruments on the protection of critical infrastructures from other risks, not covered by national strategy on the security of network and information systems, in compliance with requirements equivalent to those laid down in Articles 5 and 7 of Directive 2008/114/EC;

   b) on the identification of operators of essential services for sectors and services referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex, in compliance with requirements of Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 2016/1148/EU; on security and incident notification requirements that those operators of essential services shall implement, in compliance with requirements laid down in Article 14 of Directive 2016/1148/EU; as well as on enforcement powers and means given to competent authorities in this respect, in compliance with requirements laid down in Article 15 of Directive 2016/1148/EU;

   c) on security requirements and incident notification obligations that entities operating organized energy trading and balancing services’ platforms or venues as referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex implement, in compliance with requirements laid down in Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments, supplemented by any implementing acts, or equivalent to those laid down in Regulation 600/2014/EU, as supplemented by any implementing acts, as well as on enforcement powers and means given to competent authorities in this respect;

   d) on security requirements and incident notification obligations that digital service providers referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex implement, in compliance with requirements laid down in Article 16 of Directive 2016/1148/EU; as well as on enforcement powers and means given to competent authorities in this respect, in compliance with requirements laid down in Article 17 of Directive 2016/1148/EU;

   e) on security requirements and incident notification obligations that electronic communications operators referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex implement, in compliance with requirements laid down in Articles 13a and 13b of Directive 2002/21/EC; as well as on enforcement powers and means given to competent authorities in this respect, in compliance with requirements laid down in Articles 13a and 13b of Directive 2002/21/EC;

   f) on the identification of critical infrastructures located on the territory of the concerned Contracting Party, on security measures and operational plans that are implemented to ensure a level of security and protection of critical infrastructures for sectors and services referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex, in compliance with requirements equivalent to those laid down in Article 5 and Annex II of Directive 2008/114/EC, for risks and incidents that are not covered by the above-mentioned from b) to e), as well as on enforcement powers and means given to competent authorities in this respect.

5. Tasks

5.1. The CyberCG covers the following tasks:

   a) providing strategic guidance for the activities of the CSIRTs established and the CSIRTs network;
b) exchanging best practice on the exchange of information related to incident notification within the meaning of or equivalent to provisions in Article 14(3) and (5) and Article 16(3) and (6) of Directive 2016/1148 EU, and/or incident reporting on critical infrastructures in the Contracting Parties for at least the sectors and services referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex;

c) exchanging best practice between Parties and other stakeholders involved;

d) assist Contracting Parties in building capacity to ensure the security of network and information systems, and in securing critical infrastructures;

e) discussing capabilities and preparedness of the Contracting Parties, and evaluating national strategies on the security of network and information systems and the effectiveness of CSIRTs, and of critical infrastructures protection and identifying best practice;

f) exchanging information and best practice on awareness-raising and training;

g) exchanging information and best practice on research and development relating to the security of network and information systems and to the protection of critical infrastructures;

h) where relevant, exchanging experiences on matters concerning the security of network and information systems and of critical infrastructures, with relevant Energy Community institutions, in particular the Secretariat and the SoS CG;

i) discussing the standards and specifications with relevant stakeholders and with relevant organizations where appropriate;

j) collecting best practice information on risks and incidents;

k) examining, on an annual basis, the reports submitted;

l) discussing the work undertaken with regard to exercises relating to the security of network and information systems and of critical infrastructures, education programmes and training;

m) assisting and exchanging best practice with regard to the identification of operators of essential services by the Contracting Parties, identification of critical infrastructures, including the assessment of material adverse effect, cross-border dependencies and cross-sectoral dependencies, regarding risks and incidents, where appropriate with the assistance of the SoS CG, building on the best practice of ENISA;

n) engaging in discussions with the Contracting Party, or Contracting Parties and Member States on whose territory a potential critical infrastructure is located, and with the other Contracting Parties and Member States which may be significantly affected by the potential critical infrastructure, providing guidance for the identification of critical infrastructures or of operator of essential service and where necessary facilitating agreements between the concerned Contracting Parties and Member States on common security and protection measures;

o) discussing modalities for reporting notifications of incidents;

p) developing common methodological guidelines for carrying out risk analyses in respect of Energy Community critical infrastructures. The CyberCG shall support, through the relevant Contracting Party’s competent authority/single point of contact, the owners/operators of critical infrastructures by providing access to available best practices and methodologies as well as support training and the exchange of information on new technical developments related to critical infrastructure protection;

q) promoting convergent implementation of security requirements of network and information systems and of critical infrastructures, without imposing or discriminating in favour of the use of a particular type of technology;

r) encouraging the use of European or internationally accepted standards and specifications relevant to the security of network and information systems and of critical infrastructures.

5.2. The CyberCG shall carry out its tasks on the basis of biennial work programmes. The work programme shall outline actions to be undertaken to implement the CyberCG’s objectives and tasks.

5.3. The CyberCG shall take part in the meetings and activities of the SoS CG, where appropriate.

5.4. The CyberCG shall prepare a report assessing the experience gained with the strategic cooperation by October 2019, and every year thereafter, and submit it to the Secretariat, so that the latter uses it for the preparation of its implementation report for the Ministerial Council.
6. Chairs

The Cyber-CG shall nominate and appoint a Chairperson and two Vice Chairpersons for a period of two years.

7. Meetings of the Cyber-CG

7.1. The Cyber-CG will meet when considered necessary upon a motion of the Chairperson, the Chairperson of SoS CG, the Secretariat, or ENISA. The Cyber-CG will normally meet twice a year.

7.2. A draft agenda will be distributed at least two weeks before each meeting. Draft conclusions will be distributed within two weeks after the meeting for approval by the members.

7.3. The Secretariat will prepare and organize workshops, when considered useful, following the conclusions of the Cyber-CG.

8. Computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs)

8.1. CSIRTs designated by Contracting Parties covering at least the sectors referred to in point 2. e) of this Annex, responsible for risk and incident handling in accordance with a well-defined process. CSIRTs could also be established within the competent authority.

8.2. CSIRTs should have access to an appropriate, secure, and resilient communication and information infrastructure at national level in accordance with requirements of Directive 2016/1148/EU.

8.3. Contracting Parties shall inform the Secretariat and the CyberCG about the remit, as well as the main elements of the incident-handling process, of their CSIRTs.

8.4. Contracting Parties may request the assistance of the CyberCG in developing national CSIRTs.

9. CSIRTs Network

9.1. In order to promote swift and effective operational cooperation in cases of risks or incidents to information and communications networks and systems, a network of the national CSIRTs is established.

9.2. The CSIRTs Network shall be composed of representatives of the Contracting Parties CSIRTs. The Secretariat shall participate in the CSIRTs network.

9.3. The CSIRTs network shall have the following tasks:

a) exchanging information on CSIRTs' services, operations and cooperation capabilities;

b) at the request of a representative of a CSIRT from a Contracting Party potentially affected by an incident, exchanging and discussing non-commercially sensitive information related to that incident and associated risks; however, any Contracting Party's CSIRT may refuse to contribute to that discussion if there is a risk of prejudice to the investigation of the incident;

c) exchanging and making available on a voluntary basis non-confidential information concerning individual incidents;

d) at the request of a representative of a Contracting Party’s CSIRT, discussing and, where possible, identifying a coordinated response to an incident that has been identified within the jurisdiction of that same Contracting Party;

e) providing Contracting Parties with support in addressing cross-border incidents on the basis of their voluntary mutual assistance; or their mutual assistance under Chapter IV, Title IV of the Energy Community Treaty;
f) discussing, exploring and identifying further forms of operational cooperation, including in relation to: (i) categories of risks and incidents; (ii) early warnings; (iii) mutual assistance; (iv) principles and modalities for coordination, when Contracting Parties respond to cross-border risks and incidents;
g) informing the CyberCG of its activities and of the further forms of operational cooperation discussed pursuant to point (f), and requesting guidance in that regard;
h) discussing lessons learnt from exercises relating to the security of network and information systems, including from experience shared by ENISA;
i) at the request of an individual CSIRT, discussing the capabilities and preparedness of that CSIRT;
j) issuing guidelines in order to facilitate the convergence of operational practices and operational cooperation;
k) developing a blueprint for cooperation at Energy Community level in case of incidents or crisis affecting one or more Contracting Parties to such an extent that an intervention at Energy Community level is required.

9.4. The CSIRTS network produces an annual report assessing the experience gained with the operational cooperation, including conclusions and recommendations. That report shall be submitted to the CyberCG.

9.5. The CyberCG and the Secretariat shall actively support the cooperation among the CSIRTS. The CSIRTS shall build on best practice of ENISA in performing its tasks and duties, and where appropriate and possible may seek assistance from ENISA.

10. Closed-CSIRT network

10.1. Within the CSIRT network, a closed-CSIRT network is established to treat such a threat and risk landscape and incidents that are considered as classified information by the Contracting Parties concerned. The closed-CSIRT network is composed of a representative from each Contracting Party which shall have an appropriate level of security vetting and clearance equivalent to that of handling classified information at European Union level.

10.2. The closed-CSIRT network shall make use of specific certified communication means that provide a secure way to communicate the classified information. The same applies to non-written information exchanged during meetings of the closed-CSIRT network.

11. Security liaison officer for critical infrastructures

11.1. Contracting Parties should designate one security liaison officer for security issues for each critical infrastructure. The security liaison officer functions as the point of contact between the owner/operator of the Energy Community critical infrastructure, the relevant Contracting Party’s competent authority/single point of contact and the CyberCG.

11.2. Contracting Parties shall inform the Energy Community Secretariat and the Cooperation Group about the remit, as well as the main elements of the incident-handling process, of their security liaison officers.

12. Competent authorities, single point of contacts, CSIRTS and security liaison officers

12.1. Competent authorities, single points of contact, CSIRTS and security liaison officers should have adequate resources to carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks assigned to them and thereby to fulfill the objectives of Article 4 of Procedural Act 2008/02/MC-EnC.

12.2. Competent authorities, single points of contact, CSIRTS and security liaison officers, whenever appropriate and in accordance with national law, consult and cooperate with the relevant national law enforcement authorities and national data protection authorities.
13. Cooperation with ENISA

By 1 July 2019, the CyberCG shall explore possibilities and options for Contracting Parties and the Secretariat to engage as observer with ENISA on issues related to cybersecurity in Network Energy, and participate in the international activities organized by ENISA.