# Competition and State Aid law Vs Security of Supply

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
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## **Opponents or teammates?**





## 1. Competition law vs security of supply

- Long-term supply contracts (Art. 101/102 TFEU)
- TPA exemption decision for new infrastructure (regulatory)

## 2. State aid law vs security of supply

- LNG terminals
- Capacity mechanisms

# 1. Competition law vs security of supply

### Security of supply: Long-term gas supply contracts (LTC)

"The provisions of this Directive shall not prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts in so far as they comply with Community competition rules." (Art. 32(3) Gas Directive 2009/73/EC)

### Competition law

- Art. 101 TFEU
- Art. 102 TFEU

### Conflicts?

- Rationale of liberalization and market integration
- Foreclosure of markets/market segmentation
- LTCs regularly combined with anti-competitive clauses

## Gazprom case

 Territorial restrictions (*e.g.* destination clauses/resale restrictions) in LTCs are preventing free flow of gas (Art. 102 TFEU) – strategy of market segmentation along national borders in eight Member States

## • Commitment decision on 24 May 2018

- Removal of territorial restrictions
- Active steps of Gazprom to integrate gas markets in CEE. Obligation to facilitate gas flows to and from isolated markets, *i.e.* Baltic States and Bulgaria – interconnectors not sufficiently available yet
- Security of supply enhanced by using Art. 9 Reg. 1/2003

# Open gas cases on gas flow restrictions

- Qatar Petroleum (opening proceedings: 21 June 2018)
  - Long-term agreements for supply of LNG into EEA may contain **territorial restrictions**

- **Transgaz** (opening proceedings: 1 June 2017)
  - Strategy to restrict gas exports from Romania to other Member States
  - Transgaz offered commitments on 21 September 2018

## Interconnector Greece – Bulgaria (IGB)

- Exemption decision of 25 July 2018: IGB has been exempted from TPA (booked capacity), regulated tariffs, and ownership unbundling for 25 years (Art. 36 Gas Directive 2009/73/EC)
- Commission's assessment (DG ENER)
  - Security of supply: connection to TAP and Greek system
  - **Competition**: new entrants on upstream (Gazprom) and downstream market (Bulgargaz)
  - Exemption should correspond to duration of LTCs (25 years)
- Contradiction to BEH proceedings (DG COMP) (opening proceedings in 2013)? Concern: BEH prevents competitors from gaining access to key gas infrastructure

# 2. State aid law vs security of supply

### Security of supply

- LNG terminals: Diversification and more independence
- Capacity mechanisms: Generation adequacy

### State aid law

- I. Existence of aid (Art. 107(1) TFEU)
- II. Compatibility assessment (Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU)

### Assessment under Treaty and more specific assessment under EEAG 2014

- Clearly-defined objective of common interest
- Necessary, appropriate, incentive effect, and proportionate
- Aid must not affect competition to an extent contrary to the common interest

### Conflict or convergence?

# LNG terminals

 State aid approvals for LNG terminals in Poland (2011), Greece (2012), Lithuania (2013), and Finland (2015 and 2016)

## Objective of common interest: Security of supply

- Aid measures ensure availability of new sources of gas

## Distortion of competition and balancing test

- Impact on competition between LNG terminals and between gas sources
- Conclusion: On balance, the contribution to an **important objective of common** interest outweighs the negative effects on competition

## Capacity mechanisms

 State aid approvals for mechanisms in several Member States: 2018 in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, France and Greece

## • Objective of common interest: Security of supply

- Aid measures ensure availability of sufficient amount of electricity

## Distortion of competition and balancing test

- Increase capacity in wholesale market (overcapacity?) and remuneration of only some market participants
- Conclusion: Participation rules sufficiently addressed (different technologies; operators from other Member States); incentives to invest in interconnectors not reduced (Sect. 3.9 EEAG 2014). Negative effects of capacity mechanism are kept to minimum

## Electricity market reform

- Legislative proposal for regulation on internal market for electricity ("Winter Package")
- New design principles for national capacity mechanisms
- Trilogue discussions between EP and Council are currently under way. EP advocates stricter conditions but Member States prefer to retain more discretion
- Already approved capacity mechanisms might have to be reviewed and EEAG might have to be adapted

## Conclusions

- Competition and State aid law play together with security of supply in one team and not against each other
- Gazprom case: Competition law was able to ensure free flow of gas despite LTCs, thereby enhancing security of supply
- Latest TPA exemption decision also supports security of supply