

## A new role for the Agency

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## **Overview**

## • Current role of the Agency

• Future role of the Agency



Directives 2009/72/EC , 2009/73/EC Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, 714/2009 and 715/2009

#### Third Energy package

Regulation No 1227/2011


Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT)

Regulation No 347/2013

Regulation on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (TEN-E)



Framework Guidelines / Network Codes process





#### **Overview Gas Network Codes and Guidelines**





#### **Market monitoring**

## As a result, MSs supply sourcing costs are further converging, although some differences persist leading to welfare losses

2014 calculated gas sourcing cost<sup>\*</sup> compared to TTF (= 23.7 € /MWh)

Source: ACER estimates based on NRA input, Eurostat Comext, BAFA, Platts.

<1 euro/MWh 1-3 euro/MWh >3 euro/MWh

Price levels are higher in those regions with


- less developed hubs
- weaker interconnection
- less competitive market frames

\* Suppliers' sourcing costs take into account both border import and diverse hub-product prices. A weighted average of monthly sourcing costs and demand is performed to obtain the yearly figure.



# The Ukrainian market is getting more integrated into the EU gas market

#### Ukraine gas imports (bcm/month) and estimated Ukrainian gas import prices - €/MWh




Source: Volumes from ENTSOG TP, Ukrtransgaz and IEA. Import prices: ACER estimates based on Naftogaz, EnergyPost.eu and ICIS Heren.



### Gas Interconnector Poland Lithuania

- 530 km pipeline with initial capacity
  2.4 bcm/y, cost €558 m, net
  benefits €830 m
- Aimed at ending isolation of Baltic Member States from EU gas market and at diversifying gas supply



#### Process


- 1 May 2014: no NRA decision within 6 months deadline, investment request referred to ACER
- May July: consultations with NRAs and project promoters
- 11 August: Decision No 01/2014 adopted and notified to parties concerned. Decision published on 29 August



#### Assessment

- Admissibility, completeness and maturity
- Costs and benefits by Member State

#### **GIPL Costs and Benefits (€m)**



## **Cross-Border Cost Allocation**

(ACER Recommendation No 07/2013 of 25 September 2013)

Payer TSO	<b>Recipient TSO</b>	Compensation Payment (€m)	
AB Amber Grid (LT)	Gaz-System S.A. (PL)	54.9	(64.0%)
JSC Latvijas Gāze (LV)	Gaz-System S.A. (PL)	29.4	(34.3%)
AS EG Vorguteenus (EE)	Gaz-System S.A. (PL)	1.5	(1.7%)
<b>Total Compensation</b>		85.8	(100%)

Compensation payable upon project commissioning



## • Current role of the Agency

## • Future role of the Agency



#### European Commission Vice President Šefčovič on the Energy Union





#### The Energy Union Communication

"A framework strategy for a resilient energy union with a forwardlooking climate change policy"

> Brussels, 25.2.2015 COM(2015) 80 final

- ACER currently acts primarily through recommendations and opinions. It has very limited decision-making rights.....
- EU-wide regulation of the single market should be strengthened, through a significant reinforcement of the powers and independence of ACER to carry out regulatory functions at the European level in order to enable it to effectively oversee the development of the internal energy market and the related market rules as well as to deal with all cross-border issues .....



#### The New Energy Market Design

Communication from the Commission launching the public consultation process on a new energy market design

Brussels, 15.7.2015 COM(2015) 340 final

- In line with the increased cooperation of system operators, the powers and independence of ACER may need to be reinforced so that it is able to carry out regulatory functions at European level where needed. ACER could then arbitrate in regional and EU level disputes...
- Could include power to adopt directly applicable and binding decisions on EUlevel initiatives and cross-border issues and introduction of enforcement powers to ensure compliance with such decisions....



An increasingly integrated EU market requires an appropriate dynamic regulatory framework and cooperation arrangements

#### Key Conclusions in the "Bridge to 2025" (September 2014) In line with the Energy Union strategy

Customers and all stakeholders central and must be engaged Consumers involved in providing flexibility	ACER likely to have an increasing role in a more integrated EU energy market	Appropriate regulatory oversight will be needed ENTSOs' evolving role and New bodies created Clear role and rules for DSOs	IEM open to neighbouring countries Building regulatory capacity along IEM principles
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#### **Oversight of ENTSOs and other Bodies**

- Increasingly important role of ENTSOs
- Effective oversight by ACER of the ENTSOs and of other bodies with critical/monopoly IEM functions
- ACER to be able to issue binding decisions

#### **Stronger NRAs Coordination**

- ACER to replace "all NRAs" in taking CACM 3rd-level decisions
- Mechanisms to further enhance cooperation and coordination among NRAs
- ACER to be allowed to issue "own-initiative":
  - "Peer review" Opinions
  - **Recommendations for Good Practices**
  - Opinions on the application of Guidelines

**Monitoring of Markets** 

• ACER to be given powers to require information from all EU energysector entities when needed for monitoring



ENTSOs role strengthened to act in the interest of the Union; subject to robust governance and effective regulatory oversight Regional Security Coordinators (RSCs) key part of the future power market; a roadmap for the geographical scope of RSCs to be defined; the role of RSCs enhanced and clearer Effective regulatory oversight at regional level						
ENTSOs to operate in the Union's interest, distinct from the interests of TSOs	Stronger ENTSOs statutory and financial independence from member TSOs, direct funding	ENTSOs power to request necessary assistance from TSOs (e.g. info)	ENTSOs to adopt robust decision- making rules	ACER powers to issue binding decisions to ENTSOs and sanctions for non- compliance with ACER decisions or with ENTSOs tasks		



Governance of power exchanges is important NEMOs must cooperate within a formal framework; under regulatory oversight; take coordinated decisions according to transparent rules				
Require NEMOs to establish <b>a common</b> <b>body</b> to cooperate	Establish clear general rules for the NEMOs' <b>coordinated decision</b> <b>making</b> and for implementation	Effective regulatory oversight of the common NEMO body and ACER powers to issue binding decisions, and impose sanctions for non-compliance with ACER decisions or with NEMO tasks		
Similar governance and regulatory issues may emerge in the case of Gas Booking Platforms				



# Thank you for your attention

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